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Army Digitization: Making it
Ready for Prime Time
CHRISTOPHER J. TOOMEY

T

oday’s emerging strategic environment and operational challenges demand that the Army develop a more responsive and mobile force while
maintaining the lethality necessary to fight and win our nation’s wars.1 The
Army is developing the Future Force as the long-term solution while the
structurally-new current force, characterized by the Stryker Brigade Combat
Teams, is a near- and mid-term solution for a more responsive, mobile, agile,
and versatile medium-weight force.2 Simultaneously, the current force, starting with the heavy mechanized and armored divisions, is digitizing and undergoing force structure changes to enhance its near-term ability to provide
these operational capabilities.3 Coupled with technical innovations, the structural changes—to include reduced platform density, indirect fire assets, and
combat service support footprint—will purportedly allow modernized current forces to have greater capability through information superiority and the
ability to conduct rapid, decisive operations.4
The Army’s commitment to creating a digitized force elicits some key
questions about how the Army will make the transition from an analog force in
the face of rapidly changing technology while maintaining the capability to
meet key strategic and operational challenges. For example, what are the force
structure changes that the Army needs to make to best leverage powerful information systems? What is the phasing strategy to keep units interoperable and
operationally viable during the transition? How fast should the transition occur
given that digitized systems continue to mature? What is the appropriate level
of embedding digital systems—is brigade/battalion-level the locus or should
every soldier become an information node?
The current state of Army digitization is immature and not uniformly
delivering the promised capability to justify the current changes in the force
structure. Despite great expenditures and effort, the current state of the digital
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“system-of-systems” and employment concepts makes clear the price of transformation, to “accept risk in the near and mid-term, causing turbulence and unexpected change . . . [while] freeing up sufficient resources for the Army to
invest in new technologies that will enhance its warfighting effectiveness in
the future.”5 The Army is accepting this risk, but there is uncertainty whether
digitization is fully ready for prime time.
This article investigates critical challenges in the Army’s current digitization efforts, including force structure implications, and provides recommendations to ensure the increasingly digitized Army maintains its capability and
readiness as it moves from an analog to a primarily digitally enabled force.

Network-Centric Warfare and Digitization
The discussion on the merits and prudence of embracing networkcentric warfare continues as a great debate both within the Army and across
the Department of Defense. Yet, regardless of its merits, it is safe to say that
network-centric warfare, a term with a constantly evolving definition but one
firmly rooted in the concept of horizontal and vertical information-sharing
using advanced information technology, is the chosen path for the transformation of the United States military, and the Army is incorporating its concepts. With network-centric warfare, the Army is shifting power away from
an industrial-age focus on mass toward access and flow of information as an
essential element of combat power.6
The business world has capitalized on leaps in effectiveness gained
from digital communications, including dramatic information-sharing within
established networks with real-time collaboration. The Army seeks to infuse
these same qualities in its units in order to conduct rapid, decisive operations
at the operational and tactical levels by using digital “information technologies
to acquire, exchange, and employ timely information throughout the battlespace.”7 Success relies on proliferation of a near-universal situational understanding gained through a “Common Relevant Operating Picture” and
near-to-real-time intelligence. There is access to both sensors and shooters
through various grids that will allow rapid and precise identification and engagement of targets, which promotes the execution of dominant maneuver and
precision effects.8 Digitization also facilitates a streamlined, focused logistical
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system geared to anticipate rather than respond to requirements by perfecting
dynamic inventory management and dispatching centralized assets to arrive
“just in time.”9
The Division XXI structure is the modernized structure for current
heavy forces.10 In it, the Army significantly reduced the number of tanks and
mechanized vehicles in its armor and mechanized infantry battalions from 58
to 45, while expanding the assigned area of operations by 50 percent. This
translates to a dramatic decrease of actually 25 percent (four to three platforms) in the fighting edge of the unit, the line platoons. Supposedly, “the new
[digital] systems’ enhanced capabilities, coupled with improved [situational
understanding], make these smaller battalions more effective.”11 They are expected to be more agile, more mobile, and more deployable, while exercising
more decisive dominant maneuver.
This change, as well as the reduction in organic indirect fire assets
and significant reduction in combat support and combat service support units
within the division, was made for several reasons. First, there is an increasing
need to make the mechanized and heavy forces lighter and more deployable.
By reducing the total number of heavy assets and the combat service support
package within the division, the division can deploy faster. Next, the assets
garnished from these units can be spread across the entire force to modernize
reserve component units or support other programs. Finally, it is believed that
the power of the digital systems employed by the unit can provide the information overmatch to not only compensate for the loss of more traditional
measures of combat power,12 but also actually produce a net increase in combat power while operating over a dramatically expanded battlespace.13
Associated with these reductions is an increase in the number of
communications systems, particularly relay/retransmission vehicles used to
establish and maintain the tactical internet. Mounted primarily on soft vehicles, the relay/retransmission and additional satellite systems are normally
devoid of any self-protection and are absolutely critical to digital communications within the division and subordinate units. Vulnerable and truly highvalue assets, they require significant protection.
The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) is a new organization,
optimized for complex and urban terrain and the ability to leverage complex
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (C4ISR)14 systems. The SBCT has many of the characteristics of the modernizing mechanized force: increased battlespace, reduced
combat platform density, reduced indirect fire assets, reduced organic combat service support, and increasingly soft communications assets compared
to comparable formations. Again, the thought that network-centric enablers
are sufficient force-multipliers drives much of the force structure.15
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The Digital Promise Not Fully Realized
Reports from the field indicate that current digitization efforts may be
unable to match the needed operational capabilities. There are sufficient issues
with digital systems and integration across the Doctrine, Training, Leaders,
Organization, Materiel, Personnel, and Facilities (DTLOMPF) to question the
ability of these units to fully match needed operational capabilities.
Reports also indicate that digital skills are neither easily acquired
nor retained and require a steep learning curve for both soldiers and leaders.
“It takes a long time for human crews to learn how to intuitively operate”
these complex systems-of-systems.16 The current generation of complex digital tools has only added to an already heavy individual and collective training
burden. Accordingly, commanders must make hard choices about the amount
of training that soldiers receive and often find the time by sacrificing other
training. The lack of an institutionally based, Army-wide digitization training strategy makes the situation worse. When it comes to digitization, civilian
contractors fielding the systems or their numerous modifications do most of
the training.17 Digital expertise, the knowledge to effectively use the systems
in combat, rests with highly talented contractors, not with uniformed soldiers. There is no influx of trained, digitally aware soldiers, and this will not
happen in the foreseeable future.
Within the Army training base overseen by Training and Doctrine
Command, often referred to as the “Institutional Army,” there are scarce digital assets to train system operators and leaders in time- and resource-intensive
digital skills and employment principles. However, since there is minimal effort at personnel stabilization (there was some stabilization during the establishment of the initial SBCT, but not for key leaders), an inordinate amount of
time is required to ensure new operators and leaders are digitally trained. This
is particularly important with leader training that is focused on employing the
systems as battle command tools as opposed to operator training that involves
system manipulation. The turnover of key leaders dramatically affects the
units’ continued ability to use the systems effectively.
The Army Battle Command System18 is a training-intensive family
of software. Even the most rudimentary software changes require extensive
retraining.19 Though efforts are in place to control the pace of software updates, maintaining a stable training platform is very difficult. Subsequent
versions of the software do not assure backward compatibility and interoperability, while a rigid and inflexible address book tied to individual functional area computers in the unit makes rapid task organization difficult. In
short, “legacy systems using dissimilar software and communication protocols are barriers to seamless exchanges of information.”20
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“Reports from the field indicate that current
digitization efforts may be unable to match
the needed operational capabilities.”

The current tactical network is complex, very maintenance-intensive,
and built around static, line-of-sight nodes that must go off-line during movement. Managing the node locations over complex terrain becomes extremely
challenging. The network is optimized for operations in open areas and has difficulty supporting extremely fluid operations in complex and urban terrain,
such as the mountains of Afghanistan or the streets of Baghdad. Relying on exposed nodes that require protection and depend on reliable power, the network’s physical structure is extremely vulnerable. Electronic interference,
power surges, nuances of terrain, and system crashes of individual, complex
computers all contribute to the network’s vulnerability. Maintenance of the
network and sustainment of digital systems continue to rest primarily with an
expansive cadre of civilian contractors. As the results of the preponderance of
digital training exercises demonstrate, including the Fort Hood Digital Capstone Exercise and the US Joint Forces Command joint training event Millennium Challenge 2002, establishing the network and keeping it running is a
highly specialized talent.
Digital combat service support (CSS) systems, aimed at tracking,
anticipating, and pushing logistics, are lagging well behind operational systems. Digital units currently use the old, decentralized, and more manpowerintensive “legacy” CSS management tools. Meanwhile, the CSS structure has
not only been reduced in overall size, but has been pulled back from forward
units and centralized at brigade-level and higher.21
The Secretary of Defense’s 2002 report to the President charges that
land forces must remain capable of “undertaking major combat operations . . .
across a wide range of conditions and geographic settings.”22 Unfortunately,
the major training experience associated with the digitized units considers operating them within a digital-only battlespace that is far from taxing. When
working in a static, desert environment with plenty of contractor support, the
digital tools still experienced a great deal of difficulty, enough to question their
battle-worthiness. Whether during the Division Capstone Exercises, National
Training Center Rotations, or during Millennium Challenge 2002, the digital
units operated in a digital box that included extensive provisions to compen44
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sate for the static and brittle nature of the network. They never had to fight in a
city, pick up and move 150 kilometers, keep the network operational, or maintain contact along the way. They never had to seriously conduct operations integrating analog forces or directly responding to a non-Army, non-digitized
headquarters.

The Interoperability Challenge
The current digitization strategy radically increases the interoperability challenges of forces both within the Army and across the joint and combined community. Command and control of digital forces, particularly the
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, is a vexing issue that is not fully answered.
Recently, US Army Forces Command established a “digital bridge” augmentation package for I Corps at Fort Lewis. The intent is to literally have a full
Army Battle Command System suite that can be readily integrated into the I
Corps command and control structure in order to allow simultaneous command and control of a digitized SBCT and an analog unit. The bridge will allow the transfer of analog information into the digital vernacular used by the
SBCT, and vice-versa.
A part of the force structure without a clear plan for digital modernization in the near- to mid-term is the great density of echelons above division
and echelons above corps forces—both active and reserve component—representing the modular combat support and combat service support enablers
expected to work in close conjunction with the modernized current forces.
The SBCT is incredibly austere and, based on the situation, is expected to receive augmentation from engineers, military police, civil affairs, and psychological operations units, among others. It is highly likely that these units will
arrive without any digital assets, and there is no guarantee that they will have
any digital training, to include leader training. Since the digitally disenfranchised units will not show up on the digital “screen,” their interoperability is
limited. Either they risk a significant chance of fratricide, or stringent control
measures are required to prevent mistakes. In fact, there is evidence of a
“higher number of friendly-fire kills at the National Training Center” by digitized than by analog forces.23 Clearly, the ability of non-digital assets, such as
military police and combat engineers, to function effectively in concert with
digital units is severely limited.24
There is also a substantial and glaring digital gap at the individual
soldier level. Despite years of development, the still embryonic Land Warrior
system—the system designed to link the individual soldier into the network—
is not only not ready for fielding, but still has such significant problems that it
is likely several years from fielding. This presents some challenges and limitations. Since soldiers and leaders must now be with their platforms to stay in
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the digital network, the ability of a leader to dismount and maintain the situational understanding demanded of the doctrine (and upon which much of the
system-of-systems employment is predicated) is now contested. In fact, during
training exercises at Fort Lewis, some leaders’ battlefield circulation was extremely hamstrung by this requirement to stay tied to the platforms’ computers.
Units are also challenged to track the location of both dismounted units and
individual soldiers, a particularly acute problem in close and urban terrain.
Fratricide and the complex challenges with clearing fires over a mixed digitalanalog network (where accurate information on unit locations is essential)
become increasing concerns, while the tactical flexibility of the ground-based
elements becomes hindered.

Current Efforts to Mitigate the Problem
As the Army moves towards the Future Force, it is rushing to ensure
that the current force is postured to take full advantage of the eventual promise of digital systems and network-centric warfare. In doing so, it has greatly
overestimated the capability of this first-generation C4ISR infusion and
grossly underestimated the difficulties in both training and sustainment. The
result is units that are expected to have significant operational capabilities,
but they currently lack the mature digital tools necessary to justify the
changes in force structure. These units are in the dangerous position of ensuring digital systems are employed to show they work, while simultaneously
ensuring that their units can overcome shortcomings in key areas such as
combat service support so they can actually fight when called upon.
The Army is aware of the shortcomings faced by digital units and is
employing a twofold approach to address the problems while struggling to sustain combat readiness. First, the materiel and training developer communities
are attempting to solve the problem one system at a time by resolving very specific concerns as they arise. This presents several challenges: (1) this is an extremely costly and bottom-up approach that teeters between modification and
experimentation; (2) spillover problems are rampant due to the lack of a consistent, holistic approach from a system-of-systems perspective; and (3) it requires the unit to cease operations and training to integrate the change, which
often requires substantial training time in an already crowded schedule. The
Army’s second approach is to charge the unit to “make it work” by developing
alternate methods to mitigate shortfalls, commonly called “workarounds.”
Good units will always do this. However, it often results in masking critical
problems under the guise of getting the job done while pursuing imperfect,
highly localized tactics, techniques, and procedures. The solution may solve
the problem for the short term, but not deliver the kind of result needed to meet
the long-term operational requirement, and subsequently complicating inter46
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operability. Units tend to isolate those systems that do not work well and leave
them behind, while promoting systems such as the platform-level computer,
the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2), which works
very well and is now wired into most command posts. This solves the shortterm problem, but doesn’t advance learning on the bypassed concepts.

Finding a Better Way
A multilayered approach is needed to mitigate digital shortfalls in
the near- to mid-term, thus ensuring that the Army’s near- to mid-term digital
forces stay ready. Meanwhile, the Army will stay on the path to creating an effective, digitized Future Force. The following proposals suggest such a comprehensive approach.
Reinstitute an Experimental Unit
Despite the provisions of the National Security Strategy calling for
“experimentation with new approaches to warfare,” the Army has no field
unit currently dedicated as a platform to experiment with digital systems and
concepts.25 At one time, Fort Hood’s 4th Infantry Division served as an experimental unit. However, it was returned to the pool of operational units in September 2002. Given the immaturity of the systems and the work to be done,
that was premature. Because units cannot afford a serious loss of readiness,
those that receive what are really experimental systems, as well as experimental doctrinal concepts, are constrained to employ them in a manner that
keeps the unit fully operational. Though lessons-learned are gathered from all
units, only with an experimental unit can the Army focus intensely on ensuring that new concepts and systems-of-systems are ready for force-wide introduction without constraining an operational unit with the significant effort
currently required to fully test digital systems and concepts.
The Army needs an experimental unit of at least a brigade combat
team strength to rigorously test digital systems and operational concepts. Experimental units serve to move the inherent risk of rapidly infused digital
technology out of the operationally employable force. Though this may be perceived as slowing the transformation effort, it would in fact ensure that transformation stays on track because it can move forward unfettered by near-term
operational concerns. In fact, the speed of digitization may actually increase as
more experimentation will facilitate using spiral transformation to bridge concept development to final solution with incremental steps.26
This is clearly an ongoing debate. Recently, the Office of Force
Transformation called for operational experimentation to accelerate the pace
of what it calls “rapid, spiral transformation.”27 Unfortunately, this concept
denies that good commanders and good units who are in the midst of ongoing
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“The Army needs an experimental unit of
at least a brigade combat team strength
to rigorously test digital systems.”

operations will not allow the failure often necessary to not only make systems
and concepts better, but to weed out potential dead-ends.
Additionally, the Army needs to dramatically expand and stress its
digital experimentation program within the joint environment. Millennium
Challenge 2002 notwithstanding, services are routinely exploring information dominance under fairly compartmentalized conditions with only minimal interface while they perfect information systems within their comfort
zone. Of particular interest is the digital gap the Army suffers with respect to
urban warfare. The Army should promote joint experimentation in this area to
capitalize on programs such as the Marines’ Project Metropolis, aimed at addressing command and control problems in urban areas.28
The Army should make every effort to leverage the digital work
done by the other services. For example, both the Army and the Air Force are
exploring unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for both reconnaissance and
combat missions. However, the work is being done in parallel, with limited
interface between the two services’ efforts, despite the fact that the technologies are the same.
Reduce System-of-Systems Complexity Below Brigade Combat Team
The overall systems-of-systems are much too complex below the
brigade combat team. In a battalion command post, leaders and key staff are
forced to integrate a myriad of C4ISR systems, to include a complex network
and assorted specialized computer systems. Many of these tools require the
lean battalion leadership to process and analyze information rather than receive and use it. The battalion task force should be pure units of action that
receive fully digested and relevant information and then execute their missions. The battalion needs a single command and control tool to receive the
bare bones of the Common Relevant Operating Picture and execute rudimentary orders. Currently, the proven and significantly cheaper FBCB2 fills this
need, and it should replace the battery of computers in the Army Battle Command System that austerely manned battalion and brigade operations centers
must now contend with. In fact, most digital battalions are now remoting
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spare FBCB2s into the battalion and brigade command posts to the exclusion
of the assigned ABCS systems that are in many cases being left behind. This
will not only clarify the picture coming into the command post, but also will
allow the now-ponderous command posts at battalion and brigade to become
smaller and more mobile. Additionally, the FBCB2 network has a much simpler and more survivable backbone than the ABCS network. Easier to establish, maintain, and troubleshoot, it will reduce the network management
requirements at the battalion and perhaps brigade. The counterargument is
that the complete suite of the Army Battle Command System is necessary for
commanders and leaders to gain full situational understanding. That may be
so in the future, but current system limitations outweigh any gains.
Commit to Interoperability
The lack of interoperability between digital and analog units must be
addressed. One method is providing minimum digitization across the entire
force with a universal, inexpensive Blue Feed Tracking device such as the
Maneuver Tracking System currently used by many logistics units. This will
require resource tradeoffs, but the current situation of digital haves and
have-nots is creating a force that can’t communicate with itself, while the risk
of fratricide to digitally unseen units makes an already challenging force protection and survivability problem on a complex and confusing battlefield
even more acute. Because of the “vast differences in command and control
capabilities, digital and analog units cannot seamlessly integrate and respond
to orders in an equivalent manner.”29
An alternative is to not equip every unit, but to have digital augmentation units (referred to as “hooks”) on standby, with trained operators, which
can deploy with an analog unit that will work as part a digital force. There is
an argument that digital-to-analog interoperability must be worked out, on
the ground, with the units involved. The Army no longer has the luxury of
many expensive training events (a dedicated, experimental unit could help
flesh out tactics, techniques, procedures, and doctrine), nor do we recognize
the need for long-term habitual relationships, particularly when it involves
combat support and combat service support units augmenting divisions.
With task organization often done at the arrival port or airfield, augmenting
forces are often reserve component units and arrive in small modules, often
company- and platoon-sized elements. They become easy to miss. These digital hooks—which must be part of a digital unit’s organization—can also be
used to assure interoperability between sister service and coalition forces. In
fact, this requirement is addressed in the National Security Strategy, which
stresses interoperability to “maintain the ability to work and fight together as
allies,” particularly within NATO.30
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The Army sees the corps headquarters as the basis for the Army-led
Joint Task Force headquarters. Non-digital corps will require substantial lastminute digital augmentation and integration that will be extremely difficult
during operations when rapid task organization may be necessary. The Army
should look to create corps augmentation packages akin to the I Corps digital
bridge to ensure it can conduct effective command and control of digital
forces. Certainly, this establishes a new element and structural modification
to the corps. However, the corps, as already mentioned, are moving to digitize on their own. It will be much more favorable for the Army to bring them
on-line and ensure they are fully integrated rather than employing ad hoc solutions using commercial, off-the-shelf products. This problem will become
even more acute with the dispersed nature of future combat.
Structure for Today’s Logistics
Though the Army recognizes the challenge to reduce the logistical
footprint, it needs to come to grips with the immaturity of its digital combat service support structure to provide both total asset visibility and just-in-time logistics. Operating over a much-expanded battlespace with dramatically fewer
assets, the now austere maintenance, supply, and transportation elements will
have difficulty supporting engaged digital forces that are themselves spread
out over an increasingly empty battlespace. In fact, this deficiency is well
noted with the austere Stryker Brigade Combat Teams.
In 2001, to address this shortfall, the Army created 205-person combat service support companies (CSSC) to be attached to the 392-person brigade
support battalions in each Stryker Brigade Combat Team. These companies are
primarily transportation, maintenance, and supply augmentation and represent
the Army coming to grips with the shortfall in the physics of logistics. The
Army must look to reengineer what it has done with the current force and investigate restoring some of its logistical capability, either by putting it back into
the maneuver units or augmenting the brigade forward support battalions with
habitually associated units such as the Stryker Brigade Combat Team’s combat
service support company.
Tied to logistics, but arguably worthy of separate study, is the issue
of contractors on the battlefield. How to deal with contractors is a large issue
that affects both digital system employment and sustainment. System complexity—particularly with the Army Battle Command System and its network—necessitates the need to deploy contractors for some time. The issue
of contractors on the battlefield is not a new one for the Army, but it has
changed with respect to both the number of contractors and the extent of contractor support. The Army must continually examine how it will integrate
contractors into units during active operations. One solution is to include
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them on a unit’s organizational tables as augmentation. This will ensure they
are factored into overall unit deployability and that essential life support and
combat service support are provided. Additionally, there is a host of administrative, legal, and command and control issues currently under review associated with contractors on the battlefield.31
Train and Track Digital Soldiers
At present and for the foreseeable future, trained digital soldiers and
digitally cognizant leaders are at a premium. Unfortunately, trained soldiers
and leaders are transferred under normal Army rotation policies. Though
there is a renewed discussion by the Secretary of the Army concerning stabilization, the Army needs to do something soon to ensure that it tracks digitally trained soldiers and ensures they go to digital units as much as possible
in order to take advantage of their skills while they remain scarce. This tracking can be accomplished by adding a skill identifier similar to that added for
parachute-qualified soldiers.
This recommendation has several arguments against it, including
disadvantaging the soldier by giving him repetitive tours in one spot and actually limiting the spread of digital knowledge. The first argument is losing
steam as increasingly more units are digitized. The Army plans to expand
Division XXI beyond Fort Hood to include units in Georgia and Germany.
Digital Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are standing up in Alaska, Hawaii,
Louisiana, and Germany, as well as Washington state. Thus, soldiers will
have many opportunities to serve within an increasingly digitized Army.
Without question, the ingraining of digitization must extend into the
Army’s education system and go beyond a mere descriptor. Soldiers and leaders need to not only understand how to operate digital systems, but also need
to come to grips with how to use new technology effectively. Units must focus
on the warfighting mission and do not have the time or resources to grow digital soldiers and leaders from the ground up.

Current Operations—An Opportunity
Operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq are serving as excellent
proving grounds for digital systems. In Afghanistan, the Army employed limited digital systems tied to special operations and intelligence forces who were
able to share information with fire support assets and able to dramatically synchronize joint effects. Still, despite these successes, the networks suffered from
bandwidth shortage and line-of-sight issues that will need resolution.32
Iraq will likely provide a more complete look at whether larger formations can use the current digital systems to good effect over an extended
time and distance. The digitized 4th Infantry Division is fully deployed, and
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the primarily analog 3d Infantry Division was modified to include limited
Army Battle Command System suites at battalion operations centers and
higher. Though initial reports reflect that the “level of ‘digital’ operation in
land forces . . . almost certainly fell far short of its future potential,”33 the extent to which commanders were able to employ digital systems and their effects at the tactical level—to include mitigating interoperability challenges
with the host of supporting analog combat and combat service support
units—will require detailed analysis in the months to come.

Conclusion
Today, the Army must consider the limitations and strengths in employing digital formations. Given the limitations of its established network—
fragile, training-intensive, and constrained to operate only with a legion of civilian contractors—the current digital force will have difficulty nesting itself
in a larger Army formation or a joint or combined force. With reduced firepower and more vulnerable command and control systems, digital forces may
in fact be a handicap compared to more robust and rugged analog forces that
move with the confidence of well-established tactics, techniques, procedures, doctrine, and capabilities. As the Army examines the still-unresolved
depth of digital battle command, it must wrestle with its appropriate level
compared to traditional analog methods such as a voice-over-radio network.
At what level—soldier, company, or battalion—should digital systems be the
primary means of transmitting information and exercising battle command?
It is not a question of pure technology, but of effectiveness in the fight. The
Army needs to work hard to resolve this issue.
Yet, the Army can take measures to assist it in answering these questions and to ensure its forces remain ready by insisting on continued experimentation to test equipment and concepts, ratcheting down overall system
complexity to something manageable to soldiers in the field, embedding
digital training, and ensuring interoperability and sustainment across the
force—to include providing the tools to integrate within joint and combined
formations. Though full digitization and network-centric warfare may be the
ultimate bright light at the end of the transformation tunnel, the Army must
ensure it maintains a force structure that is able to fight today while not jeopardizing the future.
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